1. Proceedings
  2. I3M
  3. 2022
  4. EMSS
  5. 10.46354/i3m.2022.emss.041

Simulation of Front-Running Attacks and Privacy Mitigations in Ethereum Blockchain 

  • a Zachary Stucke ,
  • b Theodoros Constantinides, 
  • c John Cartlidge
  • a,b,c  Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK 
Cite as
Stucke Z., Constantinides T., and Cartlidge J. (2022).,Simulation of Front-Running Attacks and Privacy Mitigations in Ethereum Blockchain. Proceedings of the 34th European Modeling & Simulation Symposium (EMSS 2022). , 041 . DOI: https://doi.org/10.46354/i3m.2022.emss.041

Abstract

Transactions sent to a public blockchain network, such as Ethereum, are initially held in the mempool before they are accepted in a block. While waiting in the mempool, these ‘in-flight’ transactions are publicly visible and vulnerable to front-running attacks, such that malicious parties use information in the transaction for their own gain and at a direct cost to the transaction owner. In this work, we introduce open-source simulation software for identifying and mitigating these attacks on Ethereum blockchains. Designed for education and research, the software introduces simple smart contracts that elaborate front-running vulnerabilities such as displacement attacks, sandwich attacks, and priority gas auctions. Users can run these attacks in a safe environment, monitor the detailed mechanics of attacks, and mitigate attacks using the MEV-geth protocol for in-flight transaction privacy.

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